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A Narrowing of the
Prior Conviction Exception
I. INTRODUCTION
The prior conviction exception should fall. This
exception, rooted in the decision of Almendarez-Torres v.
United States,1 appears as the caveat introducing the rule laid
out in Apprendi v. New Jersey:2 "Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."3 While the
exception has survived thus far through United States v.
Booker; as well as the recent decision of Shepard v. United
1 523 U.S. 224 (1998). Petitioner Almendarez-Torres was a deported alien
who returned to the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Id. at 227.
Depending on the interpretation of the statute, he faced up to twenty years of
imprisonment since his initial deportation followed a conviction for an aggravated
felony. Id. at 227-28. See discussion infra Part II.B.
2 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Petitioner Apprendi plead guilty to three counts of a
twenty-three count indictment. Id. at 469-7 1. The sentencing judge found that one of
the counts pleaded fell under a sentence-enhancing "hate crime" law, which allowed an
upward departure from a proscribed sentence if the judge found a biased motivation
behind the crime. Id. at 417. Apprendi appealed the finding. Id.; see discussion infra
Part II.D.
3 Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
4 543 U.S. 220 (2005). This decision consolidates two cases - the captioned
case and United States v. Fanfan.
Respondent Booker was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute at
least fifty grams of cocaine base, punishable under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (USSG) by a range of ten years imprisonment to life. Id. at 227. The
sentencing judge made further findings, using the preponderance standard, of
additional amounts of drugs distributed as well as obstruction of justice. This
increased Booker's sentence range to thirty years to life. Id. Booker challenged the
USSG inasmuch as they violated the Sixth Amendment by allowing a judge to find
facts (other than that of a prior conviction) that determine a defendant's sentencing
range. Id. at 226-27.
Respondent Fanfan was found guilty of a conspiracy that involved at least
500 grams of cocaine. Id. at 228. The sentencing judge, interpreting Blakely, decided
that Fanfan could only be given a sentencing range of sixty-three to seventy-eight
months under the USSG, instead of 188 to 235 months as he had found earlier using
upward departure findings made by him. Id. at 228-29. The case was appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court. See discussion infra Part II.E.
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States,5 its application is prone to abuse. Specifically,
sentencing courts that broadly interpret the prior conviction
exception tend to violate the very rationales that justify it,6 and
those courts that narrowly interpret the exception sometimes
walk the line. The differing applications result from a lack of
guidance by the Supreme Court in its post-Apprendi
jurisprudence. Consequently, not only is there a circuit split in
how to construe the exception, but state courts have also had to
change their interpretations of it over time.7 As long as the
exception remains precedent, courts will need guidance.
This Note attempts to provide assistance by contending
that, so long as the prior conviction exception remains law,
courts should construe it as narrowly as possible. Only this
narrow construction is consistent with the rationales the Court
uses to justify the exception. It is worth noting here that the
constitutionality of the exception appears to already be
teetering on the brink of destruction - Justice Thomas'
concurrence in Shepard indicates as much. The
unconstitutionality of the prior conviction is already well
argued in Justice Thomas' concurrence to Apprendi,9 and
treated as well in Justice Scalia's dissent to Almendarez-
Torres.1° Thus, rather than review these opinions and rehash
their legal arguments, this Note instead analyzes the
application of the exception and its practical effects. This
5 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005). Petitioner Shepard plead guilty to a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which bars felons from possessing a firearm. Id. at 1257. At
sentencing, the Government attempted to introduce evidence of Shepard's prior
burglary convictions, under a Massachusetts burglary statute, in order to raise his
sentencing range from between thirty and thirty-seven months (under the USSG) to
the fifteen year minimum mandated by § 924(e), popularly known as the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA). Id. Since Massachusetts' definition of burglary is broader than
the definition of burglary under the ACCA, the Government sought to introduce police
reports and complaint applications to assist the court in determining whether the
earlier convictions fell within ACCA's definition of burglary. Id. at 1257-58. The
admissibility of these documents was the question presented to the Court. Id.; see
discussion infra Part II.E.
6 See infra Part II.F. for these justifications.
7 See infra Part III.
8 125 S. Ct. at 1264 ("Almendarez-Torres... has been eroded by this Court's
subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now
recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided."). Justice Thomas names
himself as well as Justices Scalia, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg as supporting the
overruling of Almendarez-Torres, which founded the prior conviction exception. Id.
This is especially noteworthy since the current change in composition of the Court -
that of Chief Justice Roberts replacing the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice
Alito replacing Justice O'Connor - will not affect this majority.
9 See 530 U.S. 466, 499-523 (2000).
'o See 523 U.S. 224, 248-71 (1998).
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analysis will show that only the narrowest construction of the
exception permits it to be exercised without violating its
justifications. Although the impracticality of the prior
conviction exception does not dictate declaring it
unconstitutional, it does bolster the argument for doing so.
To show the impracticality of the prior conviction
exception, this Note will first trace its history in Part II - from
its inception in Almendarez- Torres to the present day. Part
II.A. introduces the modern context of determinate sentencing
jurisprudence, which began with McMillan v. Pennsylvania.11
By "modern determinate sentencing jurisprudence," this Note
means that line of Supreme Court cases which have held
determinate sentencing, or sentencing under some form of
extrajudicial guidelines, constitutional.12 McMillan is first in
the line of these cases, since it was in this decision that the
Court first "coined the term 'sentencing factor' to refer to a fact
that was not found by a jury but that could affect the sentence
imposed by the judge."13 Part II.B. discusses Almendarez-
Torres, which held that where prior convictions enhance a
criminal offender's sentence, the existence of those prior
11 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
12 It is worth distinguishing determinate from indeterminate sentencing
schemes at this point. Stephanos Bibas outlines the difference between the terms, as
well as their change in meaning over time:
The term "indeterminate sentences" used to refer to broad ranges set by
judges (for example, five to ten years). Within these broad ranges, parole
boards often determined the ultimate release dates. Determinate sentences,
in contrast, were precise sentences set by judges (for example, eight years). In
more modern parlance, indeterminate sentencing allows judges to set
sentences anywhere below the statutory maxima (for example, anywhere
from zero to twenty years for armed robbery). Determinate sentencing, in
contrast, uses sentencing guidelines or statutes (such as mandatory minima)
to guide or constrain judicial discretion within the statutory ranges.
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2468 n.12 (2004). This Note uses the modern form of the terms, and focuses on
determinate sentencing schemes. Note that the Supreme Court has held
indeterminate sentencing schemes constitutional. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 251-52 (1949) (allowing a judge, but not compelling him, to rely on facts
outside the trial record in determining whether to sentence a defendant to death); see
also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005) ("If the Guidelines as currently
written could be read as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than
required, the selection of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts,
their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment."); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 309 (2004) ("[Ilndeterminate schemes involve judicial factfinding... [b]ut the
facts do not pertain to whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence -
and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial impingement upon the traditional
role of the jury is concerned.").
"s Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 485 (2000).
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convictions need not be proved to a jury or beyond a reasonable
doubt.14 Part II.C. reviews Jones v. United States,15 which
clarified the scope of Almendarez-Torres' holding by
interpreting the federal carijacking statute.16  Part II.D.
discusses the landmark decision of Apprendi, which created a
general rule mandating that a jury must find, using the
reasonable doubt standard, any fact that increases the
maximum available penalty for a crime.17 Apprendi also carved
out the Almendarez-Torres prior conviction holding as an
exception to this general rule.18 Part II.E. examines the current
status of the prior conviction exception under the more recent
Booker and Shepard decisions, and Part II.F. elucidates the
rationales on which the exception now stands.
After explaining the justifications of the prior conviction
exception in Part II, this Note will turn in Part III to survey
cases, both federal and state, which have applied the exception
since its official articulation in Apprendi. Part III.A. examines
how some courts have broadly interpreted the exception, while
Part III.B. inspects how other courts have narrowly construed
it. Part IV will analyze these two constructions of the prior
conviction exception by comparing them with the exception's
justification illuminated in Part II. Thus, Part IV.A. analyzes
the broad interpretation and concludes that it does not conform
to the exception's justification. Part IV.B. addresses the
narrow interpretation and observes that even this construction
raises questions as to the continuing vitality of the prior
conviction exception. Part V concludes that only a narrow
interpretation of the exception is consistent with the rationale
underlying it, and that the misuse of the exception provides
another reason why the Court should ultimately strike it down.
14 See 523 U.S. at 226-27.
15 526 U.S. 227 (1999). Petitioner Jones was convicted of aiding and abetting
the use of a firearm during a crime of violence and carjacking. Id. at 229-31. The
indictment made no mention of the carjacking statute's subsections, which provided for
an increased sentence if serious bodily injury resulted during the carjacking, nor did
the indictment charge facts to support the subsections. Id. The sentencing court
imposed the increased sentence after making the necessary finding using the
preponderance standard, and Jones appealed. Id. See discussion infra Part I.C.
16 See Jones, 526 U.S. at 229-30.
17 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
'8 Id. at 489-90.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION EXCEPTION
This Part provides the necessary background of
pertinent Supreme Court decisions that bear on modern
determinate sentencing beginning with McMillan v.
Pennsylvania.19 In the context of these decisions, this Part
highlights three thematic rationales that the Court uses to
support its reasoning in exempting prior convictions from the
Apprendi rule.20 The first rationale is that courts have
traditionally treated recidivism as a sentencing factor rather
than an offense element. By "sentencing factor," this Note
means only those facts that are found by a judge, instead of a
jury, using the preponderance of evidence standard.21 In
contrast, an "offense element" requires a jury to make the
necessary factual findings using the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard.22 The second is that due process and jury trial
protections are usually already attached to a prior conviction,
thus minimizing the need for these rights when prior
convictions are subsequently examined. The third rationale is
that treating prior convictions as sentencing factors does not
create a problematic presumption of guilt, since the fact-finder
is still required to make a necessary factual finding.
A. The Rise of Modern Determinate Sentencing
Jurisprudence
The first explicit Supreme Court sanctioning of modern
determinate sentencing came in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.23
In that case, the Court held that Pennsylvania's Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Act was constitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Sixth
Amendment's right to a jury trial.24 In so holding, the decision
19 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
20 "[Any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
21 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91-92.
22 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364(1970).
23 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91-92.
24 Id. at 91-93. The Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982) (current version at
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (2004)), is reproduced in full at McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82
n.1. Relevant portions are provided here (as excerpted from the decision):
(a) Mandatory sentence. - Any person who is convicted... of [any
enumerated felony ranging from third degree murder to kidnapping, and
attempt thereofi, shall, if the person visibly possessed a firearm during the
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
upheld a rule allowing a sentencing judge to determine
whether the defendant "visibly possessed a firearm" during the
commission of the crime without using the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard of evidence.25 If the judge found this visible
possession, which the Pennsylvania legislature defined as a
"sentencing factor," the defendant would face a mandatory
minimum sentence of five years.26 In other words, the Court
allowed the sentencing judge, rather than the jury, to find a
fact in a criminal case, and to do so using the lesser evidentiary
standard of preponderance.27 The judge could do this because
such facts were considered "sentencing factors," and not
elements of the crime.2s
A sentencing factor, the Court reasoned, goes only to the
punishment for the crime, and not to the commission of the
crime.29 Citing Patterson v. New York,30 the Court rejected the
claim that "whenever a State links the 'severity of punishment'
to 'the presence or absence of an identified fact' the State must
prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt."31 While due
process requires that every element of a crime be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt,32 not every factor listed in a
criminal statute is necessarily an "element." 33  States are
commission of the offense, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least
five years of total confinement notwithstanding any other provision of this
title or other statute to the contrary.
(b) Proof at sentencing. - Provisions of this section shall not be an element of
the crime and notice thereof to the defendant shall not be required prior to
conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's intention to proceed
under this section shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing.
The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The court
shall consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford the
Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any necessary
additional evidence and shall determine, by a preponderance of the evidence,
if this section is applicable.
(c) Authority of court in sentencing. - There shall be no authority in any court
to impose on an offender to which this section is applicable any lesser
sentence than provided for in subsection (a) ....
25 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 81; § 9712.
26 See § 9712.
27 The Court also went on to note that "[s]entencing courts have traditionally
heard evidence and found facts without any prescribed burden of proof at all."
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91.
28 Id. at 85-86.
29 See id. at 87-88.
30 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
31 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84 (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214).
32 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
33 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84-85.
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accorded deference when defining criminal conduct, since crime
prevention and prosecution are more the concern of states than
the federal government 34  Thus, when states draft their
criminal statutes, it is within their authority to distinguish
factors that only bear on sentencing from those that constitute
elements of an offense.35 Consequently, the Court declared that
it will not invalidate a state's criminal statute under the Due
Process Clause unless it offends a fundamental principle of
justice - like withholding the reasonable doubt standard to find
the elements of a criminal offense.36 A potential abuse arises,
however, as legislatures may try to circumvent due process
protection by manipulating elements of an offense into
sentencing factors, which do not require the same protection as
elements27 In McMillan, the manipulation of the burden of
proof for the visible possession factor was an issue.
The Court admitted that it had not defined the extent to
which a state can reallocate burden of proof requirements
while still observing due process,38 but it did provide some
guiding analysis with respect to the issue. First, the
Pennsylvania statute did not discard the due process
presumption of innocence guarantee by placing the visible
possession factor within the sole purview of sentencing
considerations. 9  The judge still had to make a finding of
visible possession of a firearm - he could not merely assume it.
Second, the statute "neither alter[ed] the maximum penalty for
the crime committed nor create[d] a separate offense calling for
a separate penalty; it operate[d] solely to limit the sentencing
court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range
already available to it .. ."4 In other words, if the factor did
more than just set a mandatory minimum (which was already
within the range of punishment the judge could impose), then
that factor would likely be considered an element rather than a
sentencing factor. Finally, the Court noted that sentencing
34 Id.
35 Id. at 89-90.
36 Id. at 85-86. Indeed, the due process requirement of proving every element
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is one such fundamental principle of justice. See
Winship, 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring), Patterson, 432 U.S. at 208.
37 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 86-87.
40 Id. at 87-88. To put it another way, "[tihe statute gives no impression of
having been tailored to permit the visible possession finding to be a tail which wags the
dog of the substantive offense." Id. at 88.
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courts have always used instrumentality factors,' 1 like the one
in the instant case, in assessing punishment.42 Given these
three considerations, along with the reasonable doubt principle
and state-deference policy noted above, the Court concluded:
"[T]here is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even
where the sentence turns on specific findings of fact."43 Sixth
Amendment modern determinate sentencing precedent was
thus born.
B. Prior Convictions as Sentencing Factors
Eleven years after deciding McMillan, the Court
confronted the issue of recidivism as a sentencing factor in the
controversial case of Almendarez-Torres v. United States.-
Petitioner Almendarez-Torres had pleaded guilty to a violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which forbids deported aliens from
returning to the United States without permission. 45  The
statute authorized up to two years of incarceration as
punishment for violation of the statute under subsection (a).46
41 Instrumentality factors deal with the tools that the criminal uses to
commit a crime. Possession of a firearm during perpetration, for example, is an
instrumentality factor. See id. at 89-90.
42 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 89-90.
43 Id. at 93.
44 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
" Id. at 226-27. The relevant portions of the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988)
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2000)), are (alterations in original):
Reentry of deported alien; criminal penalties for reentry of certain deported
aliens.
(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who -
(1) has been ... deported.... and thereafter
(2) enters.... or is at any time found in, the United States [without
the Attorney General's consent or the legal equivalent],
shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any alien
described in such subsection -
(1) whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for
commission of [certain misdemeanors], or a felony (other than an
aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under title 18,
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; or
(2) whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for
commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under
such title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
McMillan, 477 U.S. at 229.
46 § 1326(a).
1340 [Vol. 71:3
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The question before the Court was whether subsection (b)(2),
which provided for a punishment of up to twenty years of
imprisonment if the alien's initial deportation "was subsequent
to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony," defined
a separate crime from subsection (a), or was only a sentencing
factor which a judge could consider in enhancing a sentence.47
The Court adopted the latter interpretation.4
Initially, the Court noted that the subject matter of
subsection (b)(2) was recidivism, a "typical ... sentencing
factor as one might imagine."49 After a lengthy analysis of the
statute's construction and history, the Court concluded that
subsection (b)(2) was only a sentencing factor.5° The Court then
addressed the underlying rationales that permitted the use of
recidivism as a sentencing factor. First, it recognized In Re
Winship's51 interpretation of the Due Process Clause that
"protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged."52 Nevertheless, it
distinguished Winship since that decision did not consider
which particular facts of a crime are constitutionally required
to be treated as elements of the substantive crime.53  The
recognition of this shortcoming was integral for the Court,
since it allowed the Court to parse sentencing factors from
elements without offending Winship's due process guarantee of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court, however, had to
reconcile two conflicting cases before it could conclude-
Mullaney v. Wilbur 54 and Patterson v. New York. 55
In Mullaney, a unanimous Court struck down Maine's
homicide statute56 which presumed all intentional homicides to
17 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226.
48 Id. at 226-27.
49 Id. at 230.
50 Id. at 235.
51 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Appellant Winship was a twelve year-old boy who
was found, by a preponderance of the evidence, to have committed what would have
been the crime of larceny had he been an adult. Id. at 360. The question before the
Court was whether the reasonable doubt standard was required, as a matter of due
process, during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding. Id. at 359. The
Court held in the affirmative. Id. at 360-61.
52 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 239-40 (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 364).
53 Id. at 240.
54 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
55 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
5r The murder statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964) (repealed
1976), provided: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought,
either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment
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have been committed with malice.57 This presumption of
malice meant that offenders faced life imprisonment, unless
they could disprove it in order to reduce the offense to
manslaughter, a crime punishable by up to twenty years. 8
These different punishments measured different degrees of
culpability, an issue the Court observed to be within the
purview of due process. 59 Thus, the Mullaney Court held that
since the existence of malice affected the severity of
punishment for homicide, it should be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, and not presumed.60 According to the Court
in Almendarez-Torres, if one were to read Mullaney literally,
then judges would not be able to increase sentences based on
recidivism or any other factor not included in an indictment
and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.61 The
Almendarez-Torres Court was able to disregard this reading,
however, by turning to Patterson.
In Patterson, the question presented was whether, in a
New York State murder trial, it was permissible to require the
defendant to prove extreme emotional disturbance as an
affirmative defense given the Due Process Clause of the
for life." Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686 n.3. The manslaughter statute, ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2551 (1964) (repealed 1976) provided: "Whoever unlawfully kills a
human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied
malice aforethought ... shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by
imprisonment for not more than 20 years .... " Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686 n.3.
57 Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703-04. The specific problem with the statutes was
the fact that the manslaughter statute required the defendant to prove heat of passion
on sudden provocation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 691-92. The
presence of heat of passion was found to be essential in the measurement of the degree
of culpability under this statutory scheme. See id. at 696. This importance made the
existence of heat of passion integral in the definition of malice aforethought. See
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 240-41 (1998). Thus, by not
requiring the prosecution to disprove heat of passion, the statute in effect allowed the
prosecution to presume malice.
5s Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 686 n.3, 691-92.
59 Id. at 697-98. The Court went on to note that "when viewed in terms of the
potential difference in restrictions of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the
distinction established by Maine between murder and manslaughter may be of greater
importance for many lesser crimes." Id. at 698.
" See id. at 697-98, 704 ("We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of
passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide
case."). But cf McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (rejecting the claim
that "whenever a State links the 'severity of punishment' to 'the presence or absence of
an identified fact' the State must prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt").
61 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 240.
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Fourteenth Amendment.62 In a five-four opinion, the Court
held that it was permissible to shift this burden.63 The Court
found that due process does not completely prohibit states from
shifting burdens of proof, so long as the prosecution has proved
enough to force the defendant to respond with an excuse or
explanation.- In other words, as long as the prosecution proves
all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt- as
those elements are prescribed by the state's law itself - the
state may shift the burden of proving a mitigating
circumstance or affirmative defense to a defendant, but not an
element.65 This was the essential flaw in the statute at issue in
Mullaney - it presumed malice even though malice was an
indispensable element to establishing the commission of
62 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 198 (1977). N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.25 (McKinney 1975) (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney
2004)) provided:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this
subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or
excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing
contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the
first degree or any other crime.
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198-99 n.2. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 1975) (current
version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 2004)) provided:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of
such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute
murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25.
The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme
emotion disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder
to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any
prosecution initiated under this subdivision.
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 199 n.3.
63 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 197, 210.
64 Id. at 203 n.9.
65 The Patterson Court also noted that the presumption of innocence
guarantee prevents states from circumventing due process by merely labeling elements
of a crime as affirmative defenses. Id. at 210.
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murder under Maine law.66 In Patterson, the statute had all
the basic elements needed to convict a person of murder -
death, intent to kill, and causation - and the government had
to prove all of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt67
Thus the statute was constitutional, and it was permissible to
shift the burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance to
the defendant.68
After limiting the Mullaney decision through Patterson,
the Almendarez-Torres Court had one final case to reckon
with - McMillan.69 Indeed, the Court analogized the instant
case to McMillan in most respects save one - the maximum
penalty that defendant Almendarez-Torres faced under 8
U.S.C. § 1326 increased from two to twenty years if convicted
under subsection (b)(2).70 In contrast, the Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Act that McMillan was sentenced under did not
alter his maximum penalty, but rather limited the sentencing
court's discretion in imposing punishment to within the
allowed range of penalties. 71 A wider range of punishments
was thus available to a sentencing court under the statute in
Almendarez-Torres than under the statute in McMillan.72
Despite this difference, the Court decided that the use of prior
6 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 240-41 (1998). As
explained in that decision, by presuming the absence of "heat of passion," Maine made
this fact:
[Not simply a potential sentencing factor, but also a critical part of the
definition of "malice aforethought," which was itself in turn "part of" the
statute's definition of "homicide," the crime in question.... [The] Mullaney
[Court] ... held "impermissible" [this] shifting of a burden of proof "with
respect to a fact which the State deems so important that it must be either
proved or presumed."... [The Patterson] Court [on the other hand] ... held
that similar burden-shifting was permissible with respect to New York's
homicide-related sentencing factor "extreme emotional disturbance[,]" [since
tihat factor was not a factor that the state statute had deemed "so important"
in relation to the crime that it must be either "proved or presumed."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Patterson, 432 U.S. at 215-16.
67 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 198-99 nn.2-3, 205-06.
68 See id. at 210. The majority in Patterson also, in the end, categorically
tempered its holding in Mullaney regarding the link between criminal law,
punishment, and due process, by stating that Mullaney should not be read broadly. Id.
at 214-15 n.15.
69 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
70 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 235-36, 242-43; see also supra notes 45-47
and accompanying text.
7' Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243.
72 Id.
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convictions under § 1326(b)(2), as a sentencing factor, did not
render the statute unconstitutional73
To justify that conclusion, the Court analyzed four
important considerations. First, the Court indicated that
recidivism was a traditional sentencing factor, which went
solely to the punishment of the defendant and not to the
elements of the underlying offense.74 Second, the Court stated
that a mandatory minimum sentence, as in McMillan, has a
greater risk of unfairness to a defendant than the instant case's
permissive maximum sentence75 (even though McMillan had
said that the petitioners' argument seeking to make any factor
that increases a punishment an element would have had "more
superficial appeal" if a greater maximum penalty was at
stake).76 Third, the wide range of sentencing available under §
1326 did not create significant unfairness towards the
defendant, since judges have typically exercised discretion
within broad statutory ranges.7 7 Fourth, and finally, there was
no presumption of guilt or restructuring of elements in the
statute (i.e., no Mullaney violation), which precluded any
notion that Congress was abusing its legislative
responsibilities7 8 By observing these four considerations, the
Almendarez-Torres Court laid the foundation for the prior
conviction exception.79
C. A Rule with Exception is Conceived
Almendarez-Torres' holding, that Congress intended §
1326(b)(2) to set forth a sentencing factor and not a separate
criminal offense, would enshrine recidivism as a sentencing
factor in the Court's modern determinate sentencing
jurisprudence. This became more evident one year later, in
73 Id. at 246.
74 Id. at 243-44. See also Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 624 (1912)
(holding that a State need not allege prior conviction in indictment even though prior
conviction was "necessary to bring the case within the statute.").
75 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244-45.
16 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
77 Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 245-46.
78 Id. at 246.
71 In his dissent to the decision, Justice Scalia laid out an extensive argument
rejecting the prior conviction exception given prior Supreme Court jurisprudence, as
well as common law tradition. See id. at 248-71. However, Justice Scalia fell short of
concluding as much since deciding this question was unnecessary to deciding the case.
Id. at 260. The reader is strongly referred to this lengthy opinion for a deeper analysis
of the subject.
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1999, when the Court decided Jones v. United States.8° The
Jones Court considered whether the federal carjacking statute,
18 U.S.C. § 2119, defined three distinct crimes or a single one
with three different punishments contingent on certain
sentencing factors.81 These factors included whether serious
bodily injury or death occurred as a result of an armed
carjacking.82 The Court held that § 2119 established three
separate offenses each with distinct elements.s
Recognizing the import of distinguishing elements from
sentencing factors and the fact that Congress did not
unequivocally indicate the distinction in the statute, the Court
began its discussion with a statutory construction analysis.84
One fact the Court especially noted in this analysis was the
dramatic increase in penalties among the subsections - from
fifteen years maximum for the base offense, to twenty-five
years if serious bodily injury resulted in the carjacking, to life if
death resulted.- The Jones Court questioned whether such
increases were permissible without the due process safeguards
that accompany elements of an offense. 86 It also contrasted the
statute's legislative history and practice of using serious bodily
injury as an element of an offense, with the traditional use of
80 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
8' Id. at 229.
82 18 U.S.C. § 2119, at the time, read:
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, takes a
motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or
foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and
violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall -
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results, be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or beth, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of
years up to life, or both.
Jones, 526 U.S. at 230 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988 ed., Supp. V) (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000)).
83 Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-52.
84 Id. at 232.
85 Id. at 233; see also supra note 82.
86 Jones, 526 U.S. at 233. Cf United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 236
(2005) (finding that "[als [sentencing] enhancements became greater, the jury's finding
of the underlying crime became less significant[,I" and thus encroached on the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial guarantee). But cf 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1326 (2000)), the statute at issue in Almendarez-Torres, which increased a
defendant's punishment over a wide range (from two years, to ten years, to twenty
years among the subsections), but did not raise concern for the Court. See supra notes
45, 70-73, and accompanying text.
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recidivism as a sentencing factor.87 The Court acknowledged
that the statute's subsections could possibly be read as setting
forth sentencing factors rather than elements, notwithstanding
the dramatic increases in punishments among the subsections
and the traditional use of serious bodily injury as an element.18
Nevertheless, the Court held that reading these aspects of the
offense as elements was better; three separate offenses thus
existed in the statute, each with its own distinct elements that
"must be charged by indictment, proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict."89
In order to resolve any doubt regarding the preference
for an elemental reading, the Court applied the rule "where a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the
other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt
the latter."90 To show the constitutional doubt that would arise
if the Court interpreted the statute as laying out sentencing
factors, the Court turned to several previous cases already
discussed, including Mullaney, Patterson, and McMillan.91 The
Court neatly summed up the issues in these cases:
McMillan... recognizes a question under both the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the jury guarantee of the
Sixth: when a jury determination has not been waived, may judicial
factfinding by a preponderance support the application of a provision
that increases the potential severity of the penalty for a variant of a
given crime? The seriousness of the due process issue is evident
from Mullaney's insistence that a State cannot manipulate its way
out of Winship, and from Patterson's recognition of a limit on state
authority to reallocate traditional burdens of proof; the
substantiality of the jury claim is evident from the practical
implications of assuming Sixth Amendment indifference to treating
a fact that sets the sentencing range as a sentencing factor, not an
element.92
In a footnote, the Court suggested the principle upon
which it based its reasoning:
87 Jones, 526 U.S. at 235-39; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 243-44 (1998).
' Jones, 526 U.S. at 239.
89 Id. at 252.
90 Id. at 239 (quoting United States ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co.,
213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
91 Id. at 240-43.
92 Id. at 242-43.
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[Ulnder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for
a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
93
This dictum would one year later become Apprendi's
overt holding.
The Jones Court explained that it is the constitutional
safeguards which attach to the required procedures for finding
facts that matters, and not the identification of elements
themselves.-4 The Court also specifically noted the exception of
recidivism to the proposition. One basis for constitutionally
distinguishing prior convictions from other factors that can
enhance sentences is the fact that "a prior conviction must
itself have been established through procedures satisfying the
fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees."95
Another, of course, was the traditional nature of recidivism as
a sentencing factor.96
And so, from the logic of Almendarez-Torres' and Jones'
reasoning, the proposition that any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt was conceived. Along with it came
the carved out exception for recidivism, since prior convictions
were considered "traditional sentencing factors," and they
already had due process and jury protections associated with
them. It is worth recalling that the Court noted this principle
was only suggested by the prior case law at this point, and not
established. 97  In one year this suggested principle would
become concrete, though, when the Court decided a case whose
name would become synonymous with the very proposition
articulated above - Apprendi.
D. The Apprendi Doctrine and its Prior Conviction
Exception
On June 26, 2000, the Court announced its decision in
Apprendi v. New Jersey.98 The question presented in Apprendi
93 Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6.
" Id. These safeguards, restated, are "the formality of notice, the identity of
the factfinder, and the burden of proof" Id.
95 Id. at 249.
96 See id. at 249 n.10.
9' Id. at 243 n.6.
98 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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was whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment required a jury, using the reasonable doubt
standard, to make a factual determination that would
authorize the increase of a defendant's maximum sentence,
from ten to twenty years, under a New Jersey criminal
statute.99 In a five-four decision, the Court answered that
question in the affirmative. 1°° Defendant Apprendi had pleaded
guilty to three counts of a twenty-three count indictment. 101
Both the prosecutor and the defense, as part of the plea
agreement, reserved the right to request or challenge an
enhanced sentence based on the ground that one of the counts
fell under the State's "hate crime" law - a statute which
enhanced a sentence if the offense was committed with a biased
purpose. 102 The trial judge held an evidentiary hearing with
respect to Apprendi's "purpose" in committing the offense, and
found using the preponderance standard that Apprendi had
acted with a bias, so the enhancement provision applied.103
Apprendi appealed. °4
The Court began by noting that the adequacy of New
Jersey's procedure for sentence enhancement was at issue,
especially since the enhancement statute doubled the
maximum punishment a judge could impose.105 The Court also
noted that there was no ambiguity in New Jersey's statutory
scheme concerning burden of proof- i.e., there was no
presumption of guilt in the statute.10 6 Therefore, the only
99 Id. at 468-69. New Jersey Statute § 2C:39-4(a) provides that "[amny person
who has in his possession any firearm with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the
person or property of another is guilty of a crime of the second degree." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:39-4(a) (2005) (not amended since Apprendi). Such offense is punishable, "[in the
case of a crime of the second degree, for a specific term of years which shall be fixed by
the court and shall be between five years and 10 years." Id. § 2C:43-6(a)(2). Under a
separate statute - a "hate crime" law - an extended term of imprisonment is provided
for when a "trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that '[tihe defendant
in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of
individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or
ethnicity.'" Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West
Supp. 2000) (deleted by amendment in 2001)). The extended term was for between ten
and twenty years. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7(a)(3) (2005) (not amended since
Apprendi).
100 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468, 476.
101 Id. at 469-70.
102 Id. at 470; see also id. at 468 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West
Supp. 2000) (deleted by amendment in 2001)).
103 Id. at 470-71.
104 See id. at 471-74 for the procedural history of Apprendi.
105 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474-75.
106 Id. at 75.
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question before the Court was whether Apprendi was
constitutionally entitled to have a jury find beyond a
reasonable doubt the fact needed to impose the enhancement
(in this case, a "biased purpose").17 Jones foreshadowed that
answer, according to the Court.0s
The Court looked at the history of the right to trial by
jury and the right to have every element of an offense found by
a reasonable doubt standard. °9 The Court noted that any
distinction between "elements" and "sentencing factors" did not
exist when the Constitution was written.11° At that time, not
only did essential elements of an offense have to be alleged in
the indictment, but so did any circumstances that mandated a
particular punishment., The Court stated, however, that this
requirement did not preclude judges from exercising discretion
in imposing sentences; judges could exercise discretion, but
only "within the range prescribed by statute."112 In summary,
the Court concluded that "[plut simply, facts that expose a
defendant to a punishment greater than that otherwise legally
prescribed were by definition 'elements' of a separate legal
offense."1l3
The Court then acknowledged the import of Winship's
procedural protection of reasonable doubt, and the presumption
of innocence that is attached to it, given the loss of liberty and
stigma a defendant faces when convicted.114 The Court stated
that: "Since Winship, we have made clear beyond peradventure
that Winship's due process and associated jury protections
extend, to some degree, 'to determinations that [go] not to a
107 Id. at 475-76.
1os Id. at 476.
'09 Id. at 477-78.
110 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478.
As a general rule, criminal proceedinigs were submitted to a jury after being
initiated by an indictment containing "all the facts and circumstances which
constitute the offence.... stated with such certainty and precision, that the
defendant... may be enabled to determine the species of offence they
constitute, in order that he may prepare his defence accordingly... and that
there may be no doubt as to the judgment which should be given, if the
defendant be convicted." The defendant's ability to predict with certainty the
judgment from the face of the felony indictment flowed from the invariable
linkage of punishment with crime.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
... Id. at 480-81.
112 Id. at 481.
113 Id. at 483 n.10. But cf. supra notes 31, 53 and accompanying text.
114 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
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defendant's guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his
sentence.' This was a primary lesson of Mullaney v.
Wilbur ".... 115
In a footnote, the Court went on to indicate that
Patterson did not limit this aspect of Mullaney, as the statute
at issue in Patterson116 did not presume any facts required to
constitute the crime.117 Additionally, the Court limited
McMillan's holding- that legislatures could prescribe certain
factors as going only to the punishment, and not to the
elements, of a crime - to cases that do not involve alteration of
sentencing maximums. 118 By limiting McMillan's holding, the
consideration of a sentence's maximum became vital to the
Court's analysis of determinate sentencing schemes.
After reorienting its stance on Mullaney and McMillan,
the Court turned to Almendarez-Torres, which it recognized as
a possible departure from historic practice.119  The Court
changed its stance regarding this decision, stating that it
rested on the fact that Almendarez-Torres had admitted his
earlier convictions, which had been entered with their own
procedural safeguards.120 Therefore, there was no contested
issue of right to jury trial or reasonable doubt before the
Court.121 Notwithstanding the reorientation, the Court
admitted the possibility that Almendarez-Torres was
incorrectly decided given the newfound extension of due
process into the sentencing factor realm; that issue was not
before the Court in Apprendi, however, and was thus left
unresolved.122 With this issue brushed aside, the Court
115 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 (alteration in original) (internal citation
omitted). But see supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 62.
117 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485 n.12.
118 Id. at 487 n.13.
119 Id. at 487.
120 Id. at 488. These procedural safeguards refer to the right to notice, the
right to jury trial, and the right to have every element of the offense found beyond a
reasonable doubt before one is convicted. See id. at 476.
121 Id. The Court also later noted that "recidivism 'does not relate to the
commission of the offense' itself, [unlike] New Jersey's biased purpose inquiry." Id.
(quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 US. 224, 230, 244 (1998)).
122 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90. In his concurrence to this opinion, Justice
Thomas discusses the prior conviction exception and uses a historical analysis of
recidivism statutes to make an excellent case about why prior convictions should be
considered elements, rather than sentencing factors. See id. at 499-523 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). He ultimately concludes that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided,
and that prior convictions should not be exempt from the Apprendi rule. Id. at 521.
Justice Thomas' treatment of the subject is extensive, and so the interested reader is
strongly referred to it.
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declared what it had only suggested in Jones: "Other than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."123
Using this newly articulated rule, the Court declined to
interpret the New Jersey statutory sentencing scheme as
relating to sentencing factors rather than elements of the
offense.124 The enhancement statute, which used motivating
biases as factors to "enhance" the maximum punishment a
defendant faced, thus prescribed elements under the Court's
rule.125 Furthermore, the Court noted that "[wihen a judge's
finding based on a mere preponderance of the evidence
authorizes an increase in the maximum punishment, it is
appropriately characterized as 'a tail which wags the dog of the
substantive offense.'"126 In other words, findings made by a
judge using the preponderance standard, which increase the
maximum punishment a defendant faces, are elements in
reality (and require the associated due process and jury trial
guarantees). Hence, the landmark "Apprendi rule" was
created, along with an exception that stood on rather tenuous
ground. As Justice O'Connor forewarned in her dissent,
"[tioday, in what will surely be remembered as a watershed
change in constitutional law, the Court imposes as a
constitutional rule the principle it first identified in Jones."127
E. The Prior Conviction Exception as of Today
The "watershed change" that Justice O'Connor referred
to was realized in a decision that came down almost four years
later to the day of the Apprendi decision. On June 24, 2004,
the Court decided Blakely v. Washington,1- a case that dealt
with a sentencing enhancement within Washington State's
123 Id. at 490.
124 Id. at 491-97. The term "sentencing factor" was not "devoid of meaning"
though. Id. at 494 n.19. According to the Court, these factors now can only describe
mitigating or aggravating circumstances "that supportO a specific sentence within the
range authorized by the jury's finding[s]." Id.
125 Id. at 494. The Court also noted that these motivating biases, to which the
enhancing statute referred, effectively provided a second mens rea requirement - a
requirement that traditionally fell within the scope of "elements." Id. at 493.
126 Id. at 495 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986)); see
also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
127 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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Sentencing Guidelines.129 The decision did not further the
analysis of the prior conviction exception, but rather clarified
several aspects of the Apprendi rule and explained in further
detail the significance of the right to trial by jury. Although
Blakely was not about "finding determinate sentencing
schemes unconstitutional,"1 ° it did have the collateral effect of
invalidating Washington's Sentencing Guidelines. Invalidating
Washington's guidelines, however, called the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) into question, since
Washington's guidelines did not significantly differ from the
federal guidelines.131 The question concerning the
constitutionality of the USSG was presented to the Court in
United States v. Booker 132 on October 4, 2004.
On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Booker.133 This decision invalidated the USSG
inasmuch as they required a judge to impose a sentence beyond
a prescribed statutory maximum by making additional findings
of facts using the preponderance of the evidence standard.34
129 Id. at 298-301. Sentencing guidelines are a modern product of determinate
sentencing, originating in the 1970s. See JACK M. KRESS, PRESCRIPTION FOR JUSTICE:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES 3-8 (1980). As legislatures
were reforming penal codes after the American Law Institute issued its code reform in
the 1960s, a comparative sentencing reform code was lacking. Id. at 3-4. For example,
degrees of robbery might be established in a penal code, but comparable variances in
sentences would be lacking. See id. at 4. Accusations of disparate sentencing were also
leveled at the judiciary. See id. at 19-21. Furthermore, public opinion regarding the
benefits of indeterminate sentencing and the rehabilitative promises associated with it
began to erode. Id. at 5-6.
In response to these problems, reformers proposed guidelines that would
assist a sentencing judge in imposing sentences. The purpose of these guidelines is to
open access to sentencing to public scrutiny, which theoretically will reduce disparity
since judges will be more easily held accountable for the exceptional sentences they
impose. Id. at 8, 19-21. The increased access will also create a stronger appearance of
justice, since procedures are more transparent. Id. at 9-10. Sentencing guidelines also
offer compromise between the two goals that sentencing judges pursue - individualized
punishment and equality of punishment across a society. Id. at 9. Finally, sentencing
guidelines allow the collective wisdom of many judges in a given jurisdiction to bear on
the punishment of a defendant. Id. at 16. The guidelines provide a benchmark for a
sentencing judge, which not only helps train and educate judges, but also offers them
psychological reassurance that.they are justly administering punishment. Id. at 16-18.
Sentencing guidelines, while closely linked to the issues of modern
determinate sentencing regarding due process and jury trial guarantees, are not the
issue of this Note. For more on sentencing guidelines, as well as models of such
guidelines, see generally KRESS, supra (discussing sentencing guidelines); MARVIN E.
FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973) (same).
130 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 34).
131 Id. at 305 n.9.
132 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 226, 746.
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The Court once again did not consider the prior conviction
exception. It did reaffirm its Apprendi holding, restating it as:
"Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to
support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the
facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt."135 The Court also crafted a unique remedy
for the guidelines - it severed the portions of the guidelines
that made them mandatory.116 While the Court's analysis adds
nothing to the exception's jurisprudence, it does show that the
Court is not about to abandon its line of reasoning since
Apprendi. Indeed, Justice O'Connor recognized this in her
dissent to a case which seems to signal that the end of the prior
conviction exception may be near - Shepard v. United States.137
Though Shepard did not terminate the prior conviction
exception, it did appear to support a restricted reading of it.
Shepard pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which
bars felons from possessing a firearm.138 The government
sought to increase Shepard's sentencing range from between 30
and 37 months (under the now advisory USSG) to the 15-year
minimum required by § 924(e), commonly known as the Armed
Career Criminal Act (ACCA), since Shepard had prior burglary
convictions that arguably fell within the ambit of the ACCA.139
However, Shepard had pled to these prior burglary convictions
under a Massachusetts burglary statute that defines burglary
more broadly than the ACCA does.140 Specifically, the ACCA
defines burglary in generic terms, requiring the act to take
place in a building or enclosed space.141  In contrast,
Massachusetts' statute allows for the finding of burglary if it
was committed in a boat or motor vehicle in addition to a
building or enclosed space. 42 Thus, in order for Shepard's prior
burglaries to fall within the ACCA, additional findings of fact
about the prior convictions would have to be made by the judge.
The government sought to introduce police reports and
complaint applications to prove that the prior burglary
135 Id. at 244, 756.
136 Id. at 245-46, 756-57.
137 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1269 (2005) ("I have criticized that LApprendi] line of cases
from the beginning. It is a battle I have lost." (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).




142 See Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1257.
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convictions could be used as predicates to impose the ACCA,
but the district court ruled that Taylor v. United States143
precluded courts from delving into these types of materials.-"
Specifically, Taylor had held that "generic burglary could be
identified only by referring to charging documents filed in the
court of conviction, or to recorded judicial acts of that court
limiting convictions to the generic category, as in giving
instruction to the jury."145 However, Taylor was decided in the
context of jury verdicts, so the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address the different ways Courts of Appeals were
applying Taylor to guilty pleas.146 The Court found that guilty
pleas may establish ACCA predicate offenses, 147 but Taylor still
"controls the identification of generic convictions following
pleas, as well as convictions on verdicts."148 The closest analogs
to jury instructions in pleaded cases were plea colloquy
transcripts or written plea agreements, since these contained
the factual bases for the charges. 149 Thus, the Court held that
"a later court determining the character of an admitted
burglary is generally limited to examining the statutory
definition, charging document, written plea agreement,
transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by
the trial judge to which the defendant assented."150
In determining its holding, the Court noted that one of
the reasons for restricting the scope of material courts could
use in determining predicates under the ACCA is compliance
with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as defined
by the Apprendi rule.151 The problem in the instant case was
that the sentencing judge, in considering the ACCA
enhancement, had to make a factual finding that Shepard's
prior burglary took place in a building or enclosed space - a
fact about the prior conviction (since the prior conviction was
for a broader category of burglary not limited to buildings or
enclosed spaces). 152 The Court found this fact to be "too far
removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial
143 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
144 Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1257.




149 Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1259-60.
150 Id. at 1257.
151 Id. at 1262.
152 Id.
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record, and too much like the findings subject to Jones and
Apprendi [than] Almendarez-Torres .... 153 Hence, the Court
distinguished finding a fact of conviction from finding a fact
underlying the conviction; by making only the former finding
permissible, the Court appears to show a preference for
narrowly construing the prior conviction exception.
F. The Justifications for the Prior Conviction Exception
Although Shepard did not overrule Almendarez-Torres,
it certainly erodes its scope and casts doubt on the continuing
vitality of the prior conviction exception.154 While the exception
remains law, however, it is worth understanding the three
major rationales the Supreme Court uses to justify it. The first
rationale, one that has been recurrent since Almendarez-
Torres, is that recidivism is a traditional sentencing factor that
only goes to the punishment for the crime, and not to the crime
itself.115 The second rationale, articulated in Jones, is that due
process protections and the jury trial right are already afforded
to the defendant in the initial process that resulted in the
earlier conviction.15 The third rationale, which has been a
prevalent consideration of the Court for all sentencing factors
since McMillan, is that the exception does not create a
presumption of guilt so long as legislatures do not manipulate
their criminal statutes in such a way that would result in a
Mullaney violation.157 Upon closer examination, however, only
the second rationale can really justify the continuation of the
prior conviction exception.
The first rationale for the exception - that recidivism is
a traditional sentencing enhancement - is historically
contestable. Justice Thomas, in a lengthy concurrence to
Apprendi, described a history of cases, beginning roughly at the
end of the Civil War, where recidivism was used as an
aggravating element of a crime by various state legislatures.158
153 Id.
'54 Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1264 (Thomas, J., concurring). In his concurrence,
Justice Thomas notes his readiness to overrule Almendarez-Torres' prior conviction
exception, except for the fact that the parties to the case did not request such action by
the Court. Id..
155 See supra notes 49, 74, 87, 96 and accompanying text.
156 See supra notes 95, 120 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 39, 66, 78, 117 and accompanying text.
"Is Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 506-18 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opinion in Almendarez-Torres,
recognized this history as well.159 Thus, the "tradition" of using
recidivism as a sentencing factor is not as historically clear cut
as the Supreme Court's rationale indicates. A cloudy tradition
is not a basis on which a judicial rule should rely.
Not only is the historic legal use of recidivism
disputable, but the Court has abandoned this kind of argument
for other sentencing factors. Recall that in McMillan, the
Court identified instrumentality factors with traditional
sentencing factors as well.160 This logic fell, however, when the
Apprendi rule was announced. Today, instrumentality factors
that raise a defendant's sentence beyond a prescribed statutory
maximum must now be found by a jury using the reasonable
doubt standard. Hence, the Court has previously retreated
from the "traditional use" rationale. And finally, it is worth
noting that the Court in Booker disparaged arguments based
on tradition. Responding to Justice Breyer's dissent that
judges could traditionally increase sentences on their own
findings, Justice Stevens responded, "tradition... does not
provide a sound guide to enforcement of the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in today's world."161
Given all of the above, the "traditional use" rationale hardly
seems strong enough to support the prior conviction exception.
Unlike the first and second rationales, the third
rationale - that the use of prior convictions as sentence
enhancements does not create a presumption of guilt - is more
of a secondary consideration rather than a primary justification
for the prior conviction exception. Specifically, it deals with
how legislatures employ sentencing factors in their statutes.
Recall that the Supreme Court will generally defer to state
legislatures in interpreting their criminal statutes. 16 2 However,
the Court also stated that it will not allow states to manipulate
their statutes in such a way as to avoid the requirements of
due process. 163 In this context, the Apprendi rule is basically a
manifestation of this checking power - it provides objective
standards ("any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
159 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 256-57, 261 (1998)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
160 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89-90 (1986); see also supra notes
41-42 and accompanying text.
161 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235-36 (2005).
162 See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84-86.
163 See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 242-43 (1999).
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beyond the prescribed statutory maximum"') the Court can
use to decide if a legislature has manipulated its statute so as
to violate due process and the jury trial guarantees.
In the context of the prior conviction exception,
legislatures would not be allowed to write a criminal statute
that presumed the existence of prior convictions, as that would
violate due process. 165 This remains true even though prior
convictions are excepted from the Apprendi rule, as evidenced
in Almendarez-Torres.166 Ultimately, a fact-finder is required to
make the necessary finding of a prior conviction - and courts
should check sentencing statutes, as well as their own
practices, in order to make sure that this requirement is
fulfilled, much like the way the Supreme Court did throughout
its modern determinate sentencing jurisprudence.16 Thus, the
presumption of guilt rationale is better characterized as a
secondary consideration when examining the use of prior
convictions as enhancements, rather than as a primary
rationale which supports the exception itself.
Since the tradition of using prior convictions as sentence
enhancements is too murky to be credited, and the
presumption of guilt rationale is more fitting as a secondary
consideration, the only remaining rationale on which the prior
conviction exception stands is that due process and jury trial
guarantees already attach to a prior conviction. Indeed the
rationale has some sense to it. Apprendi is about preserving
the rights to a jury trial and to have one's guilt be determined
beyond a reasonable doubt; both of these rights are usually
afforded to a defendant before he is convicted. Though this
rationale appears to sustain the exception, it can only support
a very limited reading. It is this rationale that is prone to
abuse by lower courts, since they must continue to struggle
with interpreting the exception for as long as it remains
precedent. It is to these cases that this Note turns now, in
order to shed some light on the practical effects of the Court's
decisions regarding the prior conviction exception since
Apprendi.
16 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
165 This was the lesson of Mullaney. See supra notes 56-60 (discussing
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)).
165 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 39, 66, 78, 117 and accompanying text.
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III. A PORTRAIT AND ANALYSIS OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION
EXCEPTION
It is difficult to categorize the various ways that lower
courts have used the prior conviction exception. Recidivist
statutes vary among jurisdictions, as do sentencing judges'
interpretations of them. For the purposes of this Note, the
most practical way to differentiate these interpretations is by
breadth - that is, courts168 have read the prior conviction
exception either broadly or narrowly. When a court reads the
exception broadly, certain determinations are made that either
underlie the earlier conviction or proceed from the fact of the
earlier conviction's existence. In contrast, when a court reads
the exception narrowly, it looks to the "fact of the prior
conviction" itself, as well as any fact associated with it that
does not require additional subjective or factual findings. Most
courts generally agree on the appropriateness of the narrow
reading under Apprendi; there is much discord, however, on
what determinations (if any) can be made beyond the narrow
reading.
A. The Broad Reading
There are two ways a court can broadly interpret the
prior conviction exception. First, it can simply encompass all
recidivist factors under the penumbra of the prior conviction
exception, including determinations that are derived from the
existence of a prior conviction - like reviewing the daily
conduct of a defendant who is on probation.169 Second, a court
can read the exception broadly by holding expansively as to the
types of proceedings that can generate a "conviction." For
example, juvenile adjudications may be a type of prior
16 Although an extensive review of cases across the country would be
desirable, it is beyond the scale of this Note. Thus, Part III primarily uses California
Court of Appeal decisions as a representative sample, unless otherwise indicated, since
California also uses a determinate sentencing model. In addition, state-level decisions
seem fitting for discussion since Apprendi interpreted state law, and the Supreme
Court has noted deference to states with respect to criminal law. See supra note 34
and accompanying text. The focus will be on the interpretative issue of the exception.
The cases surveyed here also occurred before the Shepard decision; it remains to be
seen whether Shepard will impact the use of prior convictions in sentencing generally,
or be limited by courts only to the ACCA.
169 See, e.g., People v. Bushnell, No. B169231, 2004 WL 2011414 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 10, 2004).
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"conviction,"170 and their use as sentence enhancements have
created a lot of controversy, though there are other types of
adjudications that raise questions as well. Whichever way the
prior conviction exception is broadened, little agreement is
reached among courts as to the constitutional validity of these
two expansions.
Courts can broaden the prior conviction exception by
making the general concept of recidivism equivalent to the
term "prior conviction." The general rule for this approach is
neatly described in People v. Thomas,1'' a case where the
California Court of Appeal considered the question of whether
the failure to secure the defendant's agreement to have the
trial judge determine the truth of two prior convictions violated
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments' jury trial guarantees. 17 2
According to section 667.5 of the California Penal Code, a
defendant's sentence may be enhanced if the accused served a
"prison term" as part of the conviction.173 While the fact of a
prison term goes one step beyond the fact of a prior
conviction, 1' 4 the court held that the judge, without the use of a
jury, could properly make the determination of whether the
defendant had served a prison term in satisfaction of section
667.5.175 This is because the Supreme Court not only allowed
the judge in Almendarez-Torres to find that the defendant had
a prior conviction, but also to find that this prior conviction
involved an "aggravated felony."176 Specifically, the court noted
that Almendarez-Torres did not require due process treatment
of recidivism-related issues that enhance a defendant's
sentence but are not elemental to the crime. 17  Thus, the
170 See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002).
171 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571 (Ct. App. 2001). Thomas was convicted of "evading
an officer with willful disregard for the safety of persons or property." Id. at 572. He
appealed the use of his prior prison terms as sentence enhancements after his counsel
waived the right to a jury trial determination of the prior term allegations. Id.
172 Id. at 573.
173 Id.
174 Since not all convictions require or impose prison terms, the fact of a prior
conviction does not necessarily indicate that a defendant served a prison term.
Therefore, one would have to look beyond the fact of a prior conviction in order to
ascertain whether a defendant had served a prison term in conjunction with his
sentence.
175 Thomas, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579. The case was also resolved on the fact
that the defense counsel waived defendant's statutory right to a jury trial. Id.
176 Id.
177 See id. To be even more specific, the language employed by the Court in
Almendarez-Torres sweeps broadly by taking the specific issue of prior conviction and
throwing it under the expanded subject heading of recidivism. Almendarez-Torres v.
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California court read the language of Apprendi- "other than
the fact of a prior conviction" - broadly to include the recidivist
issue of prison terms (and not just the fact of a prior conviction
itself), based on Almendarez-Torres' broad use of recidivism.118
Cases that followed Thomas' reasoning opened the door
for recidivist factors to be lumped together under the prior
conviction exception. This became evident when courts began
to look at factors that derive from the fact of a prior conviction.
For example, in People v. Bushnell,179 the court allowed a broad
reading of the exception by not only allowing the trial court to
draw the conclusion that the defendant's numerous prior
convictions were "replete with crimes of violence," but also
allowing it to conclude that the underlying offenses were "of
increasing seriousness" as well.18 Furthermore, the appellate
court permitted the trial court to draw the "legal
determination" that the defendant's prior performance on
probation was unsatisfactory given the frequency of his
convictions.1"1 The court stated, "One cannot satisfactorily
perform the conditions of his sentence by constantly breaking
the law."182 By allowing the trial court to infer the fact that the
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998) ("At the outset, we note that the relevant
statutory subject matter is recidivism.").
178 Thomas, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579. It is worth noting at this point that
Thomas' conclusion is not necessarily incorrect - only the logic from which the decision
arrived is flawed. A "prison term" could be found by a judge without any additional
findings simply by looking at the paperwork, and not the record, of a prior conviction,
not because it is a "recidivist issue." See infra notes 199-206 (discussing People v.
George, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651 (Ct. App. 2004)). This would also be consistent with the
Court's holding in Shepard, which limited sentencing judges to certain materials when
determining predicate offenses under the ACCA. Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
1254, 1257 (2005). However, several courts have used reasoning analogous to that of
Thomas in allowing trial judges to find whether a prior conviction is one of the
enumerated types provided by a recidivist statute for sentence enhancement. See, e.g.,
United States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Under [Apprendi and
Almendarez-Torres], a fact of prior conviction includes not only the fact that a prior
conviction exists, but also a determination of whether a conviction is one of the
enumerated types qualifying for the sentence enhancement... ."); United States v.
Fresnares-Torres, 235 F.3d 481, 482 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The fact of a prior conviction
constitutes a penalty factor, and not an element of the offense .... [Therefore,] the
subsection increasing the penalty for previous deportation following conviction of an
aggravated felony - was a mere penalty provision for recidivist behavior and did not
define a separate offense.").
179 No. B169231, 2004 WL 2011414 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2004). Defendant
Bushnell was convicted of manslaughter and appealed, among other things, the use of
his prior convictions at sentencing. Id. at *1.
180 Id. at *6.
181 Id. The court did note that this determination arguably should be made by
a jury, but nonetheless allowed it as a "legal determination". Id.
182 Id.
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defendant was not complying with the terms of his probation
from the fact of repetitive offenses, the reviewing court also
allowed an additional factual and subjective finding to be made
by the trial judge without a jury or proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. This stands in direct conflict with later decisions of the
California court.183
People v. Som 8 provides another example of a judicially
found fact flowing from the existence of a prior conviction. In
this case, the trial court considered defendant Som's prior
juvenile adjudication when enhancing his sentence.'85
Specifically, the trial court found the commission of the offense
for which the defendant was charged, coupled with the fact of
the defendant's prior juvenile conviction, "showed the
defendant had not learned his lesson."'- The Court of Appeal
affirmed this finding under the auspices of recidivist factors
excluded under Apprendi's prior conviction exception.187 Hence,
Som evidences not only courts using the prior conviction
exception to consider recidivism generally, as in Thomas, but
also reveals approval for trial judges to make additional factual
and subjective determinations. Like Bushnell, Som is
inconsistent with subsequent decisions by the California Court
of Appeal, which will be considered in the next subsection.
The second way a court can broaden the prior conviction
exception is by allowing any type of prior adjudication to fall
under the exception. Examples of these prior adjudications
include those of military tribunals, petty offenses, and the
juvenile system. The use of juvenile adjudications has sparked
the most controversy regarding this method, since the jury trial
guarantee is not afforded to juvenile defendants, and the
juvenile system is oriented to rehabilitation rather than
punishment.188 Courts have thus split on the appropriate use of
these prior adjudications as predicates for sentence
enhancements.189 The broad view, led by the Eighth Circuit in
183 See infra Part III.B.
'84 No. C044464, 2004 WL 1966058 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2004). Defendant
Som was found guilty of attempted murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter.
Id. at *1.
185 Id. at *3.
186 Id.
187 Id. Again, note the broad reach of the decision's language by using
.recidivism" rather than "prior conviction." Id.
188 See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
189 Compare United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002)
(holding juvenile adjudications admissible as sentence enhancements under the prior
conviction exception), with United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001)
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United States v. Smalley,190 includes juvenile adjudications
within the prior conviction exception.
In Smalley, the Eighth Circuit deemed juvenile
adjudications as fitting under the Apprendi prior conviction
exception. 191 It mattered to the court that sufficient due process
protections - including the right to notice, the right to counsel,
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the privilege
against self-incrimination, and the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt to convict - existed in the juvenile
adjudication so as to make the judgment reliable.192 Since these
due process protections made the juvenile adjudication reliable,
a court could treat these adjudications under the prior
conviction exception without offending the Constitution.193
Although the court recognized that the jury trial guarantee is
lacking under the juvenile system, it did not believe that the
absence of this safeguard undermined the reliability of the
conviction.194 Thus, due process protections alone were
dispositive for the court - the conviction could fall under the
prior conviction exception so long as sufficient due process
protections were afforded in a prior adjudication to ensure
reliability.
B. The Narrow Reading
Notwithstanding Thomas and Bushnell, discussed
above, recent decisions from the Court of Appeal of California
offer a good example of limiting the prior conviction exception's
interpretation. Generally, these decisions reflect an
unwillingness to allow trial courts to make any determinations
that require additional factual or subjective findings beyond
the existence of the fact of a prior conviction.195 Trial courts
(holding juvenile adjudications inadmissible as sentence enhancements under the prior
conviction exception).
190 294 F.3d 1030. Defendant Smalley plead guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm. Id. at 1031. Among other issues, he challenged the use of his
prior juvenile convictions by the district court, under the ACCA, to enhance his
sentence from a maximum often years to a mandatory minimum of fifteen. Id.
191 Id. at 1033.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (holding that the use of a jury in the juvenile context would not strengthen the
factfinding function in any meaningful way and therefore is not constitutionally
required)).
195 See, e.g., People v. Haynes, No. 103248, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
9633 (Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2004).
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may, however, look at facts that are so essentially analogous to
the fact of a prior conviction that no additional findings need be
made by a judge. 196  The most extreme example of this
analogizing is finding a defendant's status as a probationary -
this status only requires the fact-finding of a prior conviction
as a predicate without further extrapolations on the part of a
trial judge. 197 Additionally, courts have also narrowed the prior
conviction exception by limiting the types of convictions that
can act as sentencing enhancements.198
People v. George99 relates the general rule analogizing
the fact of probationary status to the fact of a prior conviction.
The Court of Appeal concluded that a trial court could not find
facts to the exclusion of a jury, or admitted by the defendant,
with respect to sentencing, except for those facts that arose out
of a prior conviction.200 Based on this rule, the trial court was
constitutionally permitted to increase the defendant's sentence
relying on the judge-found fact that the defendant was on
probation at the time of the charged offense.21 According to the
court, this fact is essentially similar to a prior conviction
(where a trier of fact found the defendant's guilt), since the
status can be determined from a review of the paperwork
regarding that conviction.202 No additional findings or
extrapolations by the judge are necessary. The prior conviction
also already affords the defendant the jury trial guarantee
since a trier of fact made the determination (unless the
defendant admitted his guilt, in which case the jury trial
196 See, e.g., People v. George, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651 (Ct. App. 2004).
197 Id.
'9' See, e.g., United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
199 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651 (Ct. App. 2004). Defendant George was convicted of
two counts of residential robbery. Id. at 653. The trial court increased his sentence by
five years after finding, without a jury, that George had a serious prior felony strike.
Id. Specifically, the aggravating factors regarding the defendant's recidivism were "(3)
the current offense was more serious than the offense underlying George's prior
conviction, which was itself serious; (4) at the time George committed the current
offenses, he was on felony probation; and (5) George's prior performance on probation
was poor." Id. at 655.
200 Id. at 654-55. This language is somewhat misleading as it is seemingly
comparable to the rule used in Thomas. See supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text
(equating prior convictions with recidivism generally). However, note how the court in
George limits Thomas' rule by using the term "prior conviction" taken textually from
the Apprendi rule, George, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 655, rather than "recidivism-related
issues" as broadly discussed in Almendarez-Torres (and construed by Thomas). See
supra note 177.
201 George, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 656.
202 Id.
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guarantee would not be, implicated).203 Additionally, the
defendant's status as a probationer only goes to the
punishment.204 Notwithstanding the allowance of the
defendant's probationary status, the court did not allow the
trial court to look at the seriousness of the prior conviction, or
to determine that the defendant's prior performance on
probation was poor.20 5  This stands in stark contrast to
Bushnell.206 Thus, the court drew a line to include only those
facts that were analogous to a prior conviction (rather than
facts falling under the heading of recidivism) - in this case, the
status as a probationary arising from the earlier conviction.
The court in George did not provide specific analysis as
to why it chose to eliminate the additional recidivist factors of
prior conviction seriousness or probation performance from the
trial court's review. However, People v. Gaitan2°7 and People v.
Haynes,208 two cases where the Court of Appeal considered
whether the trial court could rely on facts that dealt with their
respective defendants' recidivist statuses when increasing their
sentences, provides this lacking analysis.29 In Gaitan, the trial
203 See id.
204 Id. (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244 (1998).
205 Id. at 655-56.
206 See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
207 Nos. A102560, A104091, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8990 (Ct. App. Oct.
4, 2004). Defendant Gaitan pleaded no contest to one count of possession of a forged
check and one count of possession of methamphetamine. Id. at *1. He challenged his
enhanced sentence after the trial court used the fact of his prior convictions as an adult
and juvenile, as well as the fact of his poor prior performance on probation, to increase
his sentence. Id. at *32-33. Note that the opinion cited was vacated by the California
Supreme Court and a new opinion was subsequently reissued. See People v. Gaitan,
Nos. A102560, A104091, 2005 WL 2651280 (Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2005). This reissued
opinion eliminates the analysis regarding the prior conviction exception this Note
relies on given the California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Black, 35 Cal. 4th
1238 (2005). Black held that under California's sentencing system, 'the upper term is
the 'statutory maximum' and a trial court's imposition of an upper term sentence does
not violate a defendant's right to a jury trial under the principles set forth in Apprendi,
Blakely, and Booker." Id. at 1254. Since Gaitan was sentenced to the upper term,
there was no Blakely violation and the 2004 opinion's discussion regarding Blakely
became unnecessary. It is questionable whether the court's 2004 analysis would have
remained valid had the Supreme Court addressed that aspect of the sentencing issue,
rather than what constituted the statutory maximum. Since I only use the 2004
analysis as an example of how lower courts can use the prior conviction exception, I
retain it for those purposes only.
208 No. 103248, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9633 (Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2004).
Defendant Haynes pleaded guilty to the crime of second degree robbery but did not
admit his prior conviction or prior prison term. Id. at *23. He challenged his enhanced
sentence after the trial court used these aggravating factors to increase his sentence.
Id. at *22-24.
209 Id. at *24; Gaitan, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8990, at *34.
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judge found many facts, including that the defendant's prior
convictions were numerous, and the fact that defendant's prior
performance on probation was unsatisfactory.210 In Haynes, the
facts at issue included the fact that the defendant's prior
convictions were of increasing seriousness, that the defendant
served prior prison terms, and that defendant's prior
performance on parole was unsatisfactory.211 Only the fact of a
defendant serving prior prison terms would withstand the
appellate court's review.212
The Gaitan court, reading the prior conviction exception
narrowly,213 declared that the facts at issue in its case- the
numerous convictions and unsatisfactory performance on
probation - did not fall within the exception since they
required additional findings that were factual and subjective.214
More specifically, to find that the defendant's prior convictions
were numerous, the trial court would have to find the number
of convictions and determine that this number was relatively
large.215 To find that the defendant's prior performance on
probation was unsatisfactory, the trial court would have to find
failures by the defendant in satisfying probationary
expectations and make subjective determinations that these
failures constituted unsatisfactory performance.216 As these
additional considerations are extrinsic to the fact of a prior
conviction, the Court of Appeal noted they require a jury
determination using the reasonable doubt standard.217 The
Haynes court applied the same logic as the Gaitan court with
respect to the facts that the defendant's prior convictions
increased in seriousness over time and the defendant's prior
performance on parole was poor.218  Those facts required
210 Gaitan, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8990, at *32-33.
211 Haynes, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9633, at *24.
212 See id. at *27.
213 Gaitan, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8990, at *34 (citing Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), as characteringAlmendarez-Torres "as a 'narrow
exception' arising from 'unique facts."). Before narrowing the interpretation of the
prior conviction exception, the court recognized that it had read the exception broadly
before, specifically noting People v. Thomas, 91 Cal. App. 4 t 212 (Ct. App. 2001).
Gaitan, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8990, at *34. For a discussion of Thomas, see
supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.




218 See People v. Haynes, No. 103248, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9633, at
*28-29 (Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2004).
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additional findings that were factual and subjective, and thus
necessitated jury determination based on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt since they were extrinsic to the fact of a prior
conviction.219
The Haynes court, though, like the court in Thomas,
allowed the fact that the defendant had served a prior prison
term to stand since it meant that he suffered a prior conviction
and required no subjective factual determination regarding the
defendant's conduct.220 However, the logic the Haynes court
used was narrower than that used in Thomas. In Haynes, the
court stated, "[blecause the fact that defendant had served a
'prior prison term' necessarily means he suffered a prior
conviction and involves no subjective factual determination
relating to the defendant's conduct, it fell within the narrow
exception recognized by Blakely."221 In contrast, the court in
Thomas relied on a broad interpretation of the exception which
included recidivism enhancements generally: "The
language. .. 'other than the fact of a prior conviction,' refers
broadly to recidivism enhancements.. .222 Thus, the
appellate court narrowed the reasoning for allowing judicial
findings of prison terms by finding that these determinations
required no additional subjective and factual determinations,
rather than allowing them under the umbrella of recidivism.
This "additional subjective and factual determinations"
observation provides a meaningful and quantifiable standard
to analyze the prior conviction exception's limitations. Before
doing so in the next Part, it is worth noting that courts have
also limited the prior conviction exception by restricting the
types of adjudications that fall within its purview. As
discussed in the preceding subsection, juvenile adjudications
have sparked much controversy regarding their use. A circuit
split has resulted, in fact, since the Eighth Circuit respectfully
went its own way on the issue in Smalley ,223 allowing prior
juvenile adjudications to fall within the prior conviction
exception.
219 Id.
220 People v. Haynes, No. 103248, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9633, at *27
(Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2004).
221 Id. (citation omitted).
222 People v. Thomas, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 579 (Ct. App. 2001).
223 See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
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Before Smalley was decided, the Ninth Circuit decided
United States v. Tighe,24 which held that juvenile prior
convictions did not fall under the ambit of the prior conviction
exception.225 The court in Tighe noted that since the ACCA,
under which the defendant was charged, raised the statutory
maximum sentence if prior convictions were found,
constitutional questions implicating Apprendi were raised.226
After reviewing the Almendarez-Torres, Jones, and Apprendi
decisions, the Ninth Circuit held that Jones' and Apprendi's
focus on the right to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was dispositive - without these two safeguards together,
a juvenile adjudication did not fall within the prior conviction
exception.227 Thus, the rights of due process and jury trial
matter under the narrow reading of the exception, whereas
only the due process rights ensuring reliability matter under
the broad reading.228
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION EXCEPTION
As one can see from the above survey, a tension exists
among courts today regarding the interpretation of the prior
conviction exception. While some courts choose to read it
broadly, as based on the broad language of the Almendarez-
Torres decision, others narrow the exception, by looking to the
Apprendi rule itselP29- perhaps with the hope that the
Supreme Court will eventually overrule Almendarez-Torres
and eliminate the tension that plagues the system today. In
this Part, this Note considers whether the justifications the
Supreme Court uses to bolster the exception, as discussed in
Part II.F., also support the various ways in which lower courts
have used it, as discussed in Part III. As will be seen, the
broad reading of the prior conviction exception cannot stand,
and the narrow reading, though clearly superior, also raises
224 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendant Tighe pleaded guilty to bank
robbery, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and interstate transportation of a
stolen vehicle. Id. at 1190. Tighe contested the constitutional validity of the ACCA,
which the court upheld, and the use of his prior juvenile convictions under the act to
enhance his sentence. Id. at 1197-98.
225 Id. at 1194.
226 Id. at 1192.
227 Id. at 1194-95.
228 See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
229 The textual reading grounds itself in the Apprendi Court's seeming
recognition that the prior conviction exception would be a "narrow exception" arising
from "unique facts." See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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doubts about whether Almendarez-Torres can ultimately be
reconciled with the spirit of Apprendi.
A. Analysis of the Broad Reading
As discussed in Part III.A., courts can read the
Apprendi prior conviction exception broadly in two ways: by
allowing all recidivist considerations under it, including
determinations that derive from the existence of a prior
conviction, or by allowing all types of prior convictions to count
under the exception. Both of these readings, however, abuse
the rationale that the prior conviction exception affords due
process and jury trial protections to the defendant since those
rights are already attached to the earlier conviction.
When construing the prior conviction broadly, courts
can make additional findings of fact that should be subject to
due process and jury trial guarantees. As discussed in Part
III.A., the courts in Bushnell and Som made additional findings
of fact that went beyond the mere existence of a prior
conviction, including determinations regarding probationary
conduct, seriousness of prior convictions, and how numerous
the prior convictions were. 230  As noted in Part III.B., the
Gaitan and Haynes courts observed that these kinds of findings
require a judge to make additional findings of fact or subjective
determinations extrinsic to the fact of a prior conviction,
including whether probation rules were violated, the level of
severity of a crime, and what constitutes "numerous" with
respect to prior convictions.231 As those courts decided, these
additional facts and subjective determinations are not readily
present from the fact of a prior conviction, and thus should be
afforded due process and trial jury rights.232 To put it another
way, these additional findings could not be found by merely
reviewing the paperwork of the conviction, as the court in
George observed. 2- This position appears consistent with the
Supreme Court's decision in Shepard, limiting judges to
reviewing only certain paperwork when considering a prior
conviction under the ACCA.2- Thus, this restricted approach
appears most in line with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
230 See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 207-22 and accompanying text.
232 Id.
233 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
234 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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In addition to making additional findings of fact and
subjective determinations, courts can broaden the exception's
interpretation by allowing any type of past adjudication to fall
within the purview of the exception, especially juvenile ones.
However, the Ninth Circuit and those who support its
reasoning in restricting juvenile adjudications from applying
provide the better argument. Since the Supreme Court
justifies the prior conviction exception on the grounds that due
process and jury trial guarantees are already afforded to the
defendant in a prior proceeding, juvenile adjudications should
not count as prior convictions.235 This is because juvenile
proceedings generally are not conducted with the use of a
jury. -6 Thus, they lack one of the fundamental protections
afforded to a defendant to make a conviction reliable.237
Furthermore, the purpose of juvenile adjudications is
rehabilitative, not punitive.238 Given the rehabilitative nature
of the proceedings, the procedural safeguards that attach to a
juvenile proceeding are distinct from those that attach to
criminal trial proceedings.- 9 Hence, if a prior conviction is not
supported by the required procedural protections that justify
the exception, that conviction should not be used to enhance a
sentence.240 The narrow reading follows this view. The narrow
reading, though, raises questions regarding the validity of the
prior conviction exception, even when looking only to the fact of
a prior conviction.
235 See Kimberly L. Johnson, Note, Should Juvenile Adjudications Count as
Convictions for Apprendi Purposes?, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 791, 808 (2004); Ellen
Marrus, "That Isn't Fair Judge"." The Costs of Using Prior Juvenile Delinquency
Adjudications in Criminal Court Sentencing, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1323, 1350-51 (2004).
231 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543-45 (1971).
237 Marrus, note 235, at 1350-51; Jeremy W. Hochberg, Note, Should Juvenile
Adjudications Count as Prior Convictions for Apprendi Purposes?, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1159, 1180-83 (2004). But see Daniel J. Kennedy, Note, Nonjury Juvenile
Adjudications as Prior Convictions Under Apprendi, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 267, 295-97
(2004) (arguing that the Smalley analysis, where compliance with the "broader concept
of due process" and not with specific jury trial right, is the better approach).
"I Johnson, supra note 235, at 806.
239 See id.
240 Juvenile adjudications, as noted, are only the most prominent example of
this controversy. Military tribunals, foreign adjudications, and petty offense
proceedings also create questions regarding their adequacy as sentence enhancements.
See Colleen P. Murphy, The Use of Prior Convictions After Apprendi, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 973, 1017-22 (2004) for more on these issues.
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B. Analysis of the Narrow Reading
Courts that narrow their reading of the prior conviction
exception do not allow judges to make additional factual or
subjective findings - the only determinations that can be made
are ones that are essentially analogous to the fact of a prior
conviction.241 Since the fact of the prior conviction has attached
due process and jury trial guarantees, it is hard to argue this
point. This approach also appears permissible since no
presumptions of guilt are drawn by judges when they make
their findings of prior convictions, except for when they
determine whether the conviction belongs to the defendant.
This point raises a question as to the validity of the exception.
It is likely that the prior conviction exception presumes
that a defendant would not contest the fact of a prior
conviction.242 As an example, a defendant might seek to
controvert the fact that a prior conviction belonged to her by
establishing that the prior conviction belonged to another
person with the same name. 243 Thus, identity would become a
contestable fact, which plays into both the broad and narrow
reading of the prior conviction exception. This kind of
presumption would violate the guarantee that all are presumed
innocent until proven guilty. However, this identity
presumption has led to two further observations on why
recidivism should receive special treatment. First is a concern
for prejudicing the jury by forcing the defendant to argue his
prior convictions.2" Although this concern attempts to mitigate
prejudice toward the defendant, it does not protect him
completely since the issue is stripped from him at the
sentencing phase. This leads to a second concern - that the
administrative costs and efficiency of trials argue in favor of
the prior conviction exception. Specifically, in order to solve
the prejudice and presumption of innocence dilemma, trials
241 See supra Part III.B.
242 Benjamin J. Priester, Structuring Sentencing: Apprendi, the Offense of
Conviction, and the Limited Role of Constitutional Law, 79 IND. L.J. 863, 935 n.89
(2004).
243 Id.
2 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 521 (2000) (Thomas, J. concurring);
see also FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
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would probably have to be bifurcated.246 This costs time and
money as juries have to be kept on for a second phase of trial.246
Although bifurcated trials raise the concern of expense,
in reality defendants would likely admit their prior convictions
in order to avoid a poor disposition with the sentencing judge.247
Even if they do not make such an admission, the costs of
proving that a prior conviction belongs to a defendant in front
of a jury seems both simple enough and negligible when
compared to the amount of additional incarceration recidivist
statutes provide.248 Besides, as the majority in Booker noted:
We recognize... that in some cases jury factfinding may impair the
most expedient and efficient sentencing of defendants. But the
interest in fairness and reliability protected by the right to a jury
trial - a common-law right that defendants enjoyed for centuries and
that is now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment - has always
outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.
249
Thus, administrative costs and efficiency must bow to
the presumption of innocence right, as must the presumption
that a prior conviction belongs to the defendant.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the course of the Court's modern determinate
sentencing jurisprudence, the Court has created and held on to
the prior conviction exception despite being prone to abuse by
lower courts. The single rationale that the Court can rely on to
justify the exception - that due process and jury trial
guarantees already attach to a prior conviction - can only
support the narrowest construction of the exception, and even
that interpretation leaves one to wonder about the exception's
continuing vitality. Indeed, the Court appears ready to strike
down the prior conviction exception and leave only the
Apprendi rule intact: any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
245 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 336-37 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Bifurcation would allow a defendant to contest a prior conviction after he has been
convicted of the charged offense. Id.
246 See id.; see also Murphy, supra note 240, at 1003-06 & n.159.
247 See Murphy, supra note 240, at 1004.
" Id. at 1004-06. Indeed, the additional loss of liberty and greater stigma
associated with increased penalties were a concern of the Apprendi court. See
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484.
249 United States v. Booker, 513 U.S. 220, 2443-44 (2005).
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The simplicity of such a rule would be an inherent value to it.
However, until that time comes, courts should construe the
prior conviction exception as narrowly as possible in order to
conform with the Court's modern determinate sentencing
jurisprudence.
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